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Abstract 
 
Despite their popularity, crowdfunding platforms 
are experiencing negative headlines as fully funded 
projects continue to fail delivering the products on 
time. Current literature postulates that funders make 
decisions by following the decisions of the crowd, and 
this herd behavior leads to less than optimal decisions. 
One explanation of the negative externalities of such 
behavior is the misfit between the information 
provided by the crowd and the information needed by 
funders. Especially in patronage crowdfunding, 
funders are investors and buyers at the same time. This 
duality coupled with the lack of supervision of projects 
creates unique challenges. In addition to opportunism 
uncertainty, funders face competence uncertainty. 
This study provides evidence that social information 
gathered from reference groups decrease these 
uncertainties. Further investigation showed that 
different reference groups provide different types of 
social information and product complexity plays a role 
in the uncertainties experienced and the importance 
given to different reference groups. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The notion underlying crowdfunding is clear: 
attaining access to the public to seek funding, 
generally for small ventures which are unlikely to get 
funding through traditional sources such as venture 
capital. The power of crowdfunding is substantial. By 
early 2016, 2.2 billion dollars were pledged on 
KickStarter, which is considered as one of the largest 
crowdfunding websites in the US [31]. However, 
despite its popularity among grassroots entrepreneurs, 
crowdfunding is not without challenges. For instance, 
only 33% of the projects on Kickstarter are 
successfully funded [31][1], and most of the projects 
raise less than $10,000 [11]. Furthermore, some of the 
successfully funded projects were even cancelled due 
to project initiators’ fraudulent promise of or over-
confidence about the final product’s quality and 
features [54].  
The vast number of projects and limited 
demonstrability of the innovative products in these 
projects are potential reasons for unsuccessful projects 
on crowdfunding platforms. These issues create 
information overload and ambiguity among funders, 
which consequently lead to herd behavior [55]. That is, 
to differentiate good projects from less desirable ones, 
funders resort to following other people’s decisions, 
assuming that others have more information about the 
project [56]. Using reference groups to form purchase 
decisions is prevalent in online shopping, especially 
when consumers have limited experience with 
products. Although herding is not always irrational 
[56], it may incur negative externalities [3], especially 
in crowdfunding [15].  
While funders can follow different reference 
groups like crowd, friends, or experts, it is not clear 
which reference group they will choose to aid their 
decision making process. Past studies have focused 
primarily on one particular reference group influence 
– peer [7] or experts [42] – and have not examined 
differences across reference groups. Additionally, past 
studies have not systematically examined the 
mechanism that drives herd behavior in crowdfunding. 
They have attributed herd behaviors to uncertainty as 
a result of funders’ limited experience or information 
to evaluate projects [48], without explicitly examining 
what may affect this uncertainty.  
In this study, we attempt to address these research 
gaps in the crowdfunding literature. Based on social 
comparison theory [6] and rational choice theory [29], 
we propose that there are two types of seller related 
uncertainty faced by a funder: seller opportunism 
uncertainty (SOP) and seller competence uncertainty 
(SCP). Furthermore, we argue that different reference 
groups (crowd/friends/experts) provide different types 
of information (explicit vs. implicit) that funders can 
utilize to reduce these distinct uncertainties. After 
distinguishing the types of uncertainty and effects of 
different reference groups, we examine when and why 
funders follow one specific reference group over the 
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others. More formally, we examine the following: 1) 
what is the distinctive informational influence that 
each reference group exerts on funders? 2) how do two 
types of uncertainty (i.e. SCP and SOP) relate when 
funders face different types of products? 3) under what 
conditions funders follow a particular group 
(crowd/friends/experts) over the others?  
This study differs from the growing body of 
crowdfunding studies in following ways. First, to our 
knowledge, our study is the first to distinguish the 
effects of various reference groups by investigating 
different types of social information each group 
provides (explicit/implicit) during funders’ decision 
making process. Second, this study differs from 
existing studies of recommendation systems and 
reference groups in e-commerce context, since in 
patronage crowdfunding (e.g., Kickstarter) funders are 
also buyers of the products that are yet to be developed 
by new entrepreneurs, limiting the ability to judge the 
products and project initiators/sellers. Thus in addition 
to opportunism uncertainty, related to seller’s honesty, 
funders face competence uncertainty, related to 
seller’s ability to produce the product. Finally, we 
provide evidence that funders choose reference groups 
based on product complexity, which influences the 
types of uncertainty they face during decision making. 
The proposed fit between the type of seller uncertainty 
and social information gives further insights into the 
unique challenges of crowdfunding websites. Our 
findings have practical implications as well. Since the 
main revenue source of crowdfunding websites is the 
fee they collect from the raised funds, by reducing the 
information uncertainty funders face and enabling 
them to make more informed decisions, these websites 
will likely have more successful funders and less 
failed projects. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
One research stream in the crowdfunding literature 
focuses on the project level and examines factors that 
influence projects’ successful funding, nature of 
projects, and the impact of project-crowd fit [7][52]. 
Another research stream concentrates on factors that 
influence funders’ decision process and contribution 
patterns such as funders’ cultural and geographic 
differences [1][17][45], desire for social interactions 
with those who are involved in to the project [33] and 
funders’ altruism [16]. The majority of the studies in 
the latter research stream focus on herd behavior.  
Among various types of crowdfunding platforms, 
[28], patronage crowdfunding has a considerably 
different dynamic among project initiators and 
funders.  While funders do not expect economic return 
in philanthropic funding, they expect economically 
rational return in lending and equity funding by 
bearing certain investment risks. In patronage funding, 
on the other hand, funders are not only investors of 
projects but also buyers of the to-be-finished product. 
This feature creates unique challenges which arise due 
to high level uncertainty as a result of lack of due 
diligence of project initiators, lack of supervision after 
project is fully funded, lack of consumer protection if 
the project fails, lack of quality control of products 
since they are yet to be produced, and lack of 
information on project initiators since they are mostly 
first time or local entrepreneurs. 
In summary, patronage crowdfunding enables 
funders to buy an unfinished product, by investing in 
someone who, most likely, is a first time entrepreneur 
that funders don’t necessarily have close ties with. 
Since these entrepreneurs are both the creators of their 
projects and also sellers of the final product, funders 
have to evaluate two different facets of uncertainty at 
the same time – whether the project initiator is 1) 
faithful or trustworthy and 2) competent to finish and 
deliver a high quality product. This complexity and 
high level of uncertainty funders face lead them to one 
of the few available information sources to make their 
decision – the crowd. That is, when funders lack the 
resources to decide on their own if a particular project 
is worth investing and, at the same time, the project 
initiator is not only trustworthy but also capable of 
finishing this project, they follow the crowd’s 
decision. Several studies have found support for this 
herd behavior [9][12][36][44]. However, further 
evidence shows that this herd behavior leads to 
negative externalities in the form of suboptimal 
decisions [16][56]. Risky or bad projects are still 
funded since funders make decisions not based on the 
characteristics of the project or its initiator but based 
on the number of people who have invested before 
them. That is, funders are likely to be attracted to 
projects which already accumulate prior investors [20]. 
However, a significant portion of these early investors 
are likely to be project initiator’s friends or family 
members [38], who may have pledged money as a 
goodwill gesture to support the venture rather than 
profiting from the investment [2]. In such cases, the 
number of prior investors does not necessarily signal 
the true quality of the project or its initiator. For 
instance, the “iFind” project on Kickstarter raised 
more than half a million dollars within weeks but 
cancelled when some funders who had relevant 
expertise started to question the viability of the project. 
If funders had access to the professional opinion at the 
1913
  
time of their decision, they might have chosen not to 
pledge instead of following the crowd and simply 
“believing” that other funders had relevant knowledge. 
 
3. Theoretical gap in current 
crowdfunding research 
 
We submit that the current state of the 
crowdfunding research provides an incomplete 
understanding of the decision process of funders, 
especially in patronage crowdfunding, for two main 
reasons. First, most studies that reported the existence 
of herd behavior investigated crowdfunding types that 
are economically rational (lending or equity). While 
the need for herd behavior may be the same 
(uncertainty due to limited information), the 
underlying assumptions may not hold true in 
patronage funding. For instance, in prosper.com, 
funders can earn more interest from high risk 
borrowers – a common high risk/high return scenario. 
However, in patronage funding, while the level of 
uncertainty may vary across projects, the maximum 
reward is generally constant – buying the product at a 
discounted price. Since funders are also consumers of 
the product, the decision cannot solely depend on the 
discount amount. Moreover, in most cases, the reward 
systems in patronage crowdfunding do not have an 
economically rational return. For instance, individuals 
may be rewarded with a simple thank you card for their 
$5 investment. Thus, it is not correct to treat decision 
makers in patronage funding only as homo economicus 
and expect that their decisions or desires are 
economically rational. When decision making lacks 
the economic motivation, social information becomes 
an important external source of information [41].  
Second, the lack of an appropriate supervisory 
system in patronage funding may lead to information 
asymmetry and agent-principal problem between 
project initiators and funders [5]. In reality, the crowd 
cannot truly assess project initiators’ competence or 
opportunism. Moreover, the crowd may include those 
who can assess the competence of the project initiator 
(e.g., experts from the same industry), or who can 
assess the opportunism of the project initiators (e.g., 
friends of the project initiator), or who can assess 
both/neither. Therefore, crowd’s behavior provides 
mixed signals at best. This is potentially one of the 
reasons of negative externalities of the herd behavior 
in patronage crowdfunding platforms. Overall, we 
argue that the information signaled by the choices of 
the crowd is not adequate to mitigate unique 
challenges of patronage funding. Better decision 
making can be achieved by providing different types 
of social information from variety of reference groups 
compared to the mixed signals of the crowd.  
The main thesis of our paper is in certain 
conditions (e.g., high product complexity) the need for 
expertise based information becomes more salient 
whereas in other conditions (e.g., low product 
complexity) the need for trust based information is 
more salient. The fit between the type of information 
decision makers need and the type of information 
reference groups provide would result in better 
decision outcomes compared to following solely the 
crowd, which provides mixed information.  
 
4. Theory and hypothesis development 
 
Rational choice theory postulates that rational 
individuals consider and compute the outcomes of 
alternative choices and choose the one they believe is 
best for their own benefits, which can be maximization 
of their utility function or attainment of their greatest 
personal advantage [35][53]. In most circumstances, 
however, individuals are unlikely to have all the 
necessary information to make a rational decision, 
which forces them to make choices not only about 
their goals but also the corresponding means to 
achieve these goals. Therefore, the information 
individuals possess becomes a key factor that 
influences their final decisions [53]. When they lack 
the necessary information, individuals seek additional 
sources of information to cope with existing 
uncertainties [47]. One available source is the 
behaviors of previous decision makers. When decision 
making becomes costly as a result of search, analysis, 
and evaluation of alternatives, individuals tend to lean 
towards irrational decision making modes such as 
imitation, habit, hunch, experimentation, impulse, or 
obedience [21]. Thus, irrational decision making – 
imitation – occurs to economize the decision-making 
process. In other words, individuals aim to make the 
right choice by minimizing the decision costs rather 
than optimizing the decision outcome, which can be 
accomplished by following others’ decisions. 
Although this herd behavior is believed to be fragile, 
and possibly leading to fads, it does not always lead to 
irrational outcomes, because in some cases the private 
information that individuals depend on to make 
decisions is not sufficient. 
One important information source that decision 
makers can use is reference groups that serve as 
anchors to relate or compare to.  Reference groups are 
psychologically significant for decision makers and 
therefore affect their behavior [4]. Social comparison 
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theory postulates that people make decisions based on 
how they associate themselves with socially 
comparable others or with their “aspirational group” 
so that they can make similar decisions [26][29]. 
Reference groups can provide social information that 
influences individuals by affecting how they perceive 
a product (informational influence), their values 
(value-expressive influence), or their behaviors 
(utilitarian influence) [49]. Within the context of our 
study, informational influence plays an important role 
in funders’ decision-making process because the 
social information is internalized and is used either to 
enhance individuals’ knowledge or improve their 
ability to cope with certain aspects of the environment. 
The more credible the information is, the more likely 
it is to be internalized, and therefore, making the 
source of information critical [49]. Previous research 
has shown that the crowd can be utilized as a reference 
group. However, the nature of the social information it 
carries is mixed because the people’s identities are not 
verified in the large social network. Based on a recent 
study, experts exist among crowds, and despite their 
comparatively small numbers, their professional 
expertise cannot be easily replaced by large crowds 
[34]. According to Burt [14], people who reside in an 
intimate social network share thick trust with each 
other, which implies that friends are more reliable and 
trustworthy compared to the crowd. Similarly, for 
experts, despite being in a distant network, they signal 
more professional knowledge compared to the crowd. 
 
4.1. The effect of reference groups on seller 
uncertainty 
 
Funders on crowdfunding sites are usually 
confronted with various types and levels of 
uncertainty. We can group these uncertainties into 
three types: funding uncertainty, seller (i.e. project 
initiator) uncertainty, and product uncertainty. In this 
study we investigated seller uncertainty, which is also 
an important determinant of product uncertainty. In e-
commerce, seller uncertainty is caused by buyers’ 
incapability to evaluate sellers due to sellers’ 
misrepresentation and opportunism, which are both 
related to sellers’ honesty [23][50]. In crowdfunding, 
seller uncertainty also exists and greatly affects 
product’s quality and project’s success. However, it is 
displayed differently from e-commerce platforms. On 
patronage crowdfunding platforms most project 
initiators are first time entrepreneurs or less known 
local or amateur artists with products yet to be 
produced. Therefore, funders are concerned about 
project initiator’s ability to successfully produce the 
product. This uncertainty is not due to seller’s 
dishonesty but rather it is due to seller’s competence. 
Thus, in addition to seller’s opportunism uncertainty 
funders also face this unique seller uncertainty related 
to seller’s competence in patronage crowdfunding.  
Moreover, in crowdfunding environment, funders 
have limited access to the necessary information they 
need to make rational choices. The available 
information is generally provided by project initiators 
in the form of words, graphs, or videos.  Lack of 
naturalness of information communicated through the 
Internet may create ambiguity [43] and increase the 
difficulty of making decisions [47]. Under such 
circumstances, decision makers usually employ other 
strategies to reduce the uncertainty level [47], such as 
collecting additional information [22], deferring 
decisions until necessary information is available [37], 
or assumption-based reasoning when additional 
information is not attainable [19].   
Individuals can also depend on external references 
to justify their decisions and choose the best 
alternative under high uncertainty resulting from 
constrained media naturalness and lack of personal 
experience [25]. As discussed earlier, this behavior 
leads to social rationality [46], where individuals 
abandon their own preferences and simply mimic 
others’ behaviors even though it can lead to 
suboptimal decisions [10]. When individuals follow 
reference groups, they internalize the social influence 
attained from the decisions of the reference group and 
in turn this internalization increases their knowledge 
about certain aspects of the environment [4]. Based on 
this rationale, we argue that funders in crowdfunding 
websites will follow the decisions of reference groups 
as a common heuristic to deal with the existing 
uncertainty. The extant crowdfunding literature 
provides limited support as the studies show herd 
behavior as funders follow the crowd’s decision 
[16][36][56].  However, we argue that similar 
rationale will hold true for other reference groups 
(experts/friends), and funders will behave similarly, 
and follow them to reduce seller uncertainty. Thus, we 
hypothesize, 
H1a: Social information from reference groups 
will reduce seller competence uncertainty. 
H1b: Social information from reference groups 
will reduce seller opportunism uncertainty.  
 
4.2. Product complexity and seller uncertainty 
 
Distinct features of competence uncertainty and 
opportunism uncertainty suggest that funders 
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experience different types of uncertainty. While 
funders face both types simultaneously, the 
magnitudes of the uncertainties are likely to vary with 
product complexity. For projects perceived to be less 
complex, funders are likely to have a good 
understanding of the product and manufacturing 
process. In these situations, funders’ main concern is 
not likely to be the sellers’ capability but the sellers’ 
potential opportunistic behaviors. For instance, if the 
crowdfunded project is a photo album by a 
photographer, the perceived product complexity 
would be low and whether the album is finished is 
more likely dependent on the photographer’s 
intentions (e.g., will she do the photo album?) rather 
than her capabilities (e.g., can she take the photos and 
make a book out of them?). Thus, we postulate that:  
H2a: When product complexity is low, seller 
opportunism uncertainty will be greater than seller 
competence uncertainty. 
On the other hand, when a product is perceived to 
be more complex (e.g., 3D printer), funders’ concern 
about seller’s competence to deliver the product is 
likely to increase. Many products offered on 
crowdfunding platforms are unique. If a product is also 
complex, then fewer individuals are likely to possess 
the necessary capability to produce it compared to one 
that is simple. Thus, in the absence of any 
credentialing information on a seller’s capabilities, 
uncertainty about the seller’s competence to deliver 
the product will increase with product complexity, as 
we hypothesize below.  
H2b: When product complexity is high, seller 
competence uncertainty will be greater compared to 
when product complexity is low. 
Since the product creators don’t have any prior 
reputation, there are likely to be concerns about their 
intentions (e.g., are they trying to make a fast buck?), 
thereby giving rise to seller opportunism uncertainty. 
These concerns are likely to become even more acute 
as product complexity increases. When product 
complexity is high, challenges to bring the project to 
fruition are likely to be novel, numerous, and 
significant, which increase the probability that the 
creator will be unable to produce the product. 
Questions about why someone is seeking funding for 
a project that has a low likelihood of succeeding are 
likely to go up, increasing the uncertainty about 
whether the seller is trying to be opportunistic. 
Therefore, we hypothesize the following:  
H2c: When product complexity is high, seller 
opportunism uncertainty will be greater compared to 
when product complexity is low. 
 
4.3. The distinctive influence of different 
reference groups 
 
One potential explanation for the negative 
externalities is the misfit between the information 
provided by the reference group (crowd) and the 
information required by the funders. Reference group 
literature suggests that while adopting social 
information, individuals use informational reference 
groups in two distinctive ways [49]. First, individuals 
actively search for information from people who have 
expertise when they do not possess the appropriate 
knowledge to make the decision. Second, individuals 
make inferences by observing the behaviors of their 
friends or family members because they deem such 
significant others as credible information sources. 
While individuals can attain reliable information 
from both groups, the types of information these 
groups provide are different. To evaluate this, we 
divided informational reference groups into two 
based on the nature of information they provide: 
explicit and implicit informational group. Explicit 
informational group is one that possesses 
professional knowledge and has weak-ties to the 
decision maker [18][27][30], whereas the implicit 
informational group is one that has interpersonal 
interaction with and strong-ties to the decision maker. 
Thus, we expect experts (friends) to be the strongest 
(weakest) source of explicit information and friends 
(experts) to be the strongest (weakest) source of 
implicit information. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H3a: Experts will provide the most explicit 
information, followed by the crowd, followed by the 
friends. 
H3b: Friends will provide the most implicit 
information, followed by the crowd, followed by the 
experts. 
We further argue that different types of 
information provided by these groups reduce different 
types of uncertainties. Individuals follow their friends’ 
decision to gain implicit information and reduce 
opportunism uncertainty, similar to trust transference 
(e.g. I don’t know the seller but I trust my friend who 
trusts the seller, therefore I trust the seller), and they 
follow experts’ decisions to gain explicit information 
and infer technical information about the product or 
the seller’s capability, whereas the information that the 
crowd carries, is relatively mixed compared to friends 
or experts. Therefore, we postulate that: 
H4a: When product complexity is high, funders are 
more likely to base their decision on the experts’ 
choice than on the crowd’s choice. 
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H4b: When product complexity is high, funders 
are more likely to base their decision on the crowd’s 
choice over their friends’ choice. 
H4c: When product complexity is high, funders 
are more likely to base their decision on the experts’ 
choice over their friends’ choice. 
H5a: When product complexity is low, funders are 
more likely to base their decision on the crowd’s 
choice over the experts’ choice. 
H5b: When product complexity is low, funders 
are more likely to base their decision on their friends’ 
choice over the crowd’s choice. 
H5c: When product complexity is low, funders 
are more likely to base their decision on their friends’ 
choice over the experts’ choice. 
 
5. Method 
 
We conducted a controlled lab experiment to test 
our proposed hypotheses. The reason for choosing this 
method is threefold. First, currently crowdfunding 
websites do not provide any reference group 
information. Therefore, to be able to collect the 
necessary data, we designed several webpages to 
mimic crowdfunding environment and incorporate 
influence of different reference groups. Second, the 
lab experiment allowed us to examine the effects of 
reference groups at different product complexities. 
Third, given the explanatory nature of our study, we 
conducted lab experiments to control potential 
confounding factors so that we can glean the reference 
group influence. To ensure generalizability, subjects 
were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk), which is considered more demographically 
diverse and less biased towards a reference group or 
project compared to students  [4][13][49]. 
The subjects first read brief introductions on the 
concept of crowdfunding and crowdfunding 
platforms. Then they read descriptions of two projects 
and saw pictures of associated high and low 
complexity products. They were told that they do not 
know the project initiators and they equally like both 
products.  Subjects were also informed about the value 
of the product and were told that they will receive a 
“Thank You” card if a project is successfully funded 
and finished. In order to minimize the development of 
preference for any particular product, subjects were 
not told that they will receive the product. Afterwards, 
in both high and low complexity product scenarios, 
subjects answered a short survey about perceived 
seller uncertainty and their decision to pledge their 
funds. The scenarios were presented in a random 
order. To control for the potential impact of different 
ratios between reference groups, we used ratios which 
resemble a real world setting: 10 experts vs. 20 friends 
and 20 experts or friends vs. crowd of 100. 
Before the main data collection, we conducted a 
pilot study to validate the high and low complexity 
projects, and ensure that subjects are equally interested 
in both projects. Manipulation of product complexity 
was based on previous research on task complexity, 
which suggests that products with more experiential 
features usually are perceived to be more complex 
[39]. Three high complexity and three low complexity 
projects were selected from real crowdfunding 
platforms. 83 subjects were recruited for the pilot 
study. Based on subjects’ ratings on product 
complexity and interest, we picked one product from 
each complexity group: 3D printers as high complex 
product (mean = 5.27/7) and photo albums as low 
complex projects (mean = 3.46/7). The t-test indicated 
that perceived project complexity was significantly 
different (p < .001). 
Measurements used in this study were adapted 
from previous research. Seller uncertainty was 
measured using scales for seller competence 
uncertainty (SCP) [32][50] and seller opportunism 
uncertainty (SOP) [23][50]. Project complexity was 
rated by subjects after they read the project 
descriptions. To operationalize the social information 
perceived from a reference group, a formative 
construct was created using scales for: 1) explicit 
information which measures the extent to which 
funders perceive expertise from a particular reference 
group to enhance the knowledge about the product; 2) 
implicit information which measures the extent to 
which funders can rely on the particular reference 
group to reduce the concern about project creator’s 
dishonest behaviors. Finally, subjects’ actual pledging 
decisions were measured by examining which product 
subjects indicated they would pledge their funds to. 
All constructs were validated in the measurement 
model using Partial Least Square (PLS), and indicated 
good convergent and discriminant validity. 
 
6. Results 
 
A sample of 326 subjects was recruited from 
MTurk. 19 failed the attention check, resulting in a 
final sample of 307. Within these 307 subjects, 163 
(53.1%) were male, and 144 (46.9%) were female. In 
general, subjects reported that they are satisfied with 
social media platforms (e.g. Facebook) (μ = 5.21/7) 
and online transactions (e.g. online payment, e-
commerce) (μ = 5.92/7). Most of the subjects are 
relatively familiar with crowdfunding platform such as 
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Kickstarter (μ = 4.74/7). Consistent with the pilot 
studies, results of the t-test showed that there was 
significant difference (p < .001) in perceived 
complexity between creating a photo album (μ= 
2.98/7) and building a 3D printer (μ = 5.43/7). The 
main effects proposed in Hypotheses 1a and 1b were 
tested in six separate path models using PLS; three 
under high complexity and three under low complexity 
scenario. Each model consists of social information 
gained from a particular reference group (modeled as 
a formative construct arising from explicit and implicit 
information scales for that particular reference group) 
leading to two types of seller uncertainty (SOP & 
SCP). Table 1 shows the path coefficients from social 
information of each reference group to SOP or SCP 
under different product complexity scenarios. 
According to the results, the social information 
provided by each single reference groups reduced 
funders’ perceived SCP and SOP in both high and low 
complexity scenarios. Therefore, H1a and H1b are 
supported. For H2a, we compared the perceived SOP 
and SCP in each scenario using t-tests. Under low 
product complexity, perceived SOP was higher than 
SCP (μsop = 4.38 vs. μscp = 3.66, p < .05). Thus, H2a is 
supported. Next, we conducted t-test to compare SOP 
and SCP across scenarios. Both SOP (μlow = 4.50 vs. 
μhigh = 5.08; p < .05) and SCP (μlow = 3.66 vs. μhigh = 
4.61; p < .05) increase when project complexity 
increases, thus H2b and H2c are supported.  
Table 1. Effect of reference group 
information on seller uncertainty 
Low Complexity 
Reference Group SOP SCP 
Experts -0.099 -0.119 
Crowd -0.116 -0.129 
Friends -0.138 -0.131 
High Complexity 
Reference Group SOP SCP 
Experts -0.105 -0.145 
Crowd -0.225 -0.203 
Friends -0.259 -0.238 
Note: All effects are significant at p < .05. 
Next, we compared the perceived explicit vs. 
implicit information from each reference group (H3). 
Our results indicated that subjects perceived the most 
explicit information from experts, and least from 
crowd (μexperts_exp = 6.21 vs. μcrowd_exp = 3.88; p <.01), 
with friends in middle (μfriends_exp = 4.19); for the 
implicit information, subjects perceived the most from 
friends, and least from experts (μfriends_imp = 4.77 vs. 
μexperts_imp = 4.18; p <.01), and crowd are in middle 
(μcrowd_imp = 4.51), but is indistinguishable from friends 
(p = 0.06). Therefore, H3a and H3b are partially 
supported. Finally, we conducted several t-tests to 
examine which reference group funders followed 
when making pledging decisions in both scenarios (H4 
& H5). Decisions are measured as a categorical 
variable. For example, when comparing crowd to 
friends in low complexity scenario, the choice of 
crowd is labeled as 1 and that of friends is labeled as 
2. Under high product complexity, funders followed 
Experts > Crowd > Friends, and under low product 
complexity funders followed Friends > Experts > 
Crowd (Table 2). Results provide support for H4a, 
H4b, H4c, H5b and H5c, but not for H5a (crowd over 
experts in low product complexity).  
Table 2. Results of pledging decisions 
Comparison 
Reference Group Followed 
Low 
Complexity 
High 
Complexity 
C vs. F F C 
C vs. E E E 
F vs. E F E 
Note: C-Crowd, F-Friends, E-Experts 
 
7. Discussion 
 
We examined the effect of reference groups on 
seller uncertainty and funder’s choice of reference 
group under different levels of product complexity in 
a patronage crowdfunding environment. Our analyses 
showed that social information from reference groups 
reduced the uncertainty faced by funders. By 
proposing two different types of social information 
(implicit vs. explicit), we were able to identify the type 
of social information each reference group provided 
during decision-making process. We found that under 
low product complexity, when funders need more 
implicit information, they followed friends over 
experts and crowd to make pledging decisions. On the 
other hand, under high product complexity, when 
people need more explicit information, they 
rationalized their pledging behaviors by following 
experts over crowd and friends. The results also 
showed that when funders evaluate low complexity 
products, they were more concerned about sellers’ 
opportunistic behaviors than sellers’ capability to 
deliver a good quality product, parallel to our 
expectations. For high complexity products, while 
both uncertainties increased, uncertainty about seller’s 
competence increased more. This is probably because 
product complexity corresponds more directly to seller 
competence uncertainty and the effect on seller 
opportunism is likely to occur indirectly via seller 
competence uncertainty. 
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Our study has several implications. First, we 
identified the mechanism by which people follow a 
particular reference group. According to our results, 
product complexity dictated the type of information 
needed by decision makers, which influenced the 
reference group followed. Second, previous research 
on informational reference groups focused on the 
amount of information [4] rather than types of 
information that these reference groups may provide. 
We divided the reference groups into explicit 
informational group providing expertise based 
information and implicit informational group 
providing trust based information. We showed that 
experts provided more explicit information than 
crowd/friends, and friends provided more implicit 
information than crowd/experts. The mixed 
(implicit/explicit) information provided by the crowd 
may be the reason why the herd behavior results in 
negative externalities in crowdfunding. This can be 
avoided if individuals use the more specific 
information provided by experts and friends.  Third, 
compared to previous research that mainly focuses on 
seller’s ethical characteristics [23][50], we introduced 
seller competence uncertainty as a new type of seller 
uncertainty that may exist in online environments. 
Although different types of seller uncertainties have 
been investigated in the literature, these studies are 
mostly in the context of e-business where the products 
are finished and sellers are generally well-established, 
in which case seller competence does not play a 
significant role. As a comparison, in patronage 
crowdfunding, sellers’ competence of delivering 
satisfactory products is indeed a major concern. This 
uncertainty can be reduced by referring to the correct 
informational reference group. Furthermore, we 
showed that the magnitude of funders’ perceived seller 
uncertainty is a function of product complexity.  
The results also have practical implications. The 
urgent issue faced by all crowdfunding platforms is 
that there are many “unqualified” projects. Funders do 
not have access to the necessary information to make 
rational decisions due to lack of supervision of 
ongoing projects, and there are low barriers to entry 
for project initiators. Due to these issues, investors 
have already had negative perceptions of 
crowdfunding. This negative attitude could further 
hurt crowdfunding platforms since the revenue model 
of these websites depends on the projects that are 
successfully funded. Our findings may guide the 
design of crowdfunding platforms. For instance, 
crowdfunding websites can enforce administrative 
mechanisms for supervision to filter out unqualified 
projects. Alternatively, they can integrate social 
information such as decisions of experts and one’s 
friends to assist decision making. As funders become 
more satisfied with their choices, they will reinvest on 
the platform, thereby benefitting the platform.  
Although we accounted for extensive aspects of 
study design and conceptualization, our study also has 
limitations. First, our study was conducted 
predominantly in one type of culture. It would be 
constructive to test the same model in different 
cultures [24]. Second, in addition to informational 
influence, friends and experts can also exert normative 
influence. Future research should also include 
normative influence to better capture the relationship 
of seller uncertainty to reference groups. Third, we 
used two similar products that funders have equal 
interest to be able to capture the effect of the reference 
groups. However, on crowdfunding websites, funders 
show varying interest to multitude of different 
products.  Studying the effect of funders’ interest can 
be a valuable venue for future research. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
Our research provides new insights on the 
usefulness of different reference groups on 
crowdfunding platforms. As a consequence of 
constant use of Internet and social media, social 
decision making has become a significant part of our 
everyday decisions. People not only adopt others’ 
ideas or decisions, they are also exerting influence on 
others. For tasks as simple as evaluating a restaurant, 
a tourism destination, or purchasing grocery, or as 
sophisticated as choosing education or career, we are 
always seeking for information and observing what 
other people have done. By examining the influence of 
the informational reference groups with respect to 
seller uncertainty and product complexity, this 
research provides insights into how funders decide to 
pledge and how we can use these insights to improve 
the design of crowdfunding platforms. 
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